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Abstract:
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to review research on litigation
in corporate finance.
Design/methodology/approach: This paper surveys studies on the
estimation of litigation risk, litigation costs, stock reaction to lawsuit
announcement, and the effect of litigation on corporate financial
policies and outcomes.
Findings: The first section presents a survey of studies that estimate
litigation risk. The authors then discuss a set of studies that focus on
the various costs associated with litigation. The third area of review is
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about studies which estimate the market reaction to a lawsuit
announcement. The next section surveys studies that examine the
relation between litigation and a variety of corporate policies,
behaviors, and outcomes. The authors then discuss the emerging
literature on how corporate political connections can influence the
outcome of litigation. The survey concludes with a brief summary and
a discussion of suggestions for future research involving corporate
litigation.
Originality/value: By providing an extensive review of the literature
on litigation in corporate finance, this survey can help researchers to
identify recent trends in litigation research and select promising new
avenues of investigation in the field.

Keywords: Corporate finance, Litigation

1. Introduction
While corporate litigation has always been present in the
corporate environment, it has lately evolved into a major source of risk
to the firm. Despite the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which was designed to curb frivolous
lawsuits, the number of corporate lawsuits has increased by more than
50 percent and corporate litigation costs have more than doubled over
the past decade.1 The total amount of settlements in class action
security lawsuits has increased from $150 million in 1997 to $9.7
billion in 2005 (Zingales, 2007). As litigation risk and costs have
increased, the study of their effects on firm value and activities has
become more critical than ever.
Litigation in corporate finance is of great interest and worthy of
investigation largely because its cost-benefit trade-off for the firm
stakeholders is unclear. While litigation costs are significant,
settlement amounts in some cases provide only payments of
attorney’s fees and do not generate any direct benefit to plaintiff
stakeholders (Romano, 1991). Many lawsuits, however, have a
beneficial role because, by imposing monetary and reputational costs
to the firm, provide external disciplining of managers and can help to
reduce agency problems within the firm (Becht et al., 2003).
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While a few studies on the costs of corporate litigation and the
effect of lawsuits on firm value began to appear in the academic press
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the creation of the Class Action
Security Lawsuit Database in the late 1990s and the Audit Analytics
Litigation Database in the 2000s allowed the generation of a large
number of empirical studies of the effects of litigation in corporate
finance. In this literature survey, we provide a review of the litigation
literature in corporate finance organized by different topic areas.
Section 2 presents a survey of studies that estimate litigation risk.
Section 3 discusses a set of studies that focus on the costs associated
with litigation. Section 4 reviews event studies on the market reaction
to the announcement of lawsuits. Section 5 surveys studies that
examine the relation between litigation and a variety of corporate
policies, behaviors, and outcomes. Section 6 discusses the emerging
literature on how corporate political connections can influence the
outcome of litigation. Section 7 concludes with a brief summary and a
discussion of future areas of research involving corporate litigation.

2. Determinants and estimation of litigation risk
One of the most common measures of litigation risk is an ex
ante proxy set as an indicator variable equal to one for firms becoming
defendant of a lawsuit in the following year and zero otherwise (e.g.
Lowry and Shu, 2002; Field et al., 2005; Arena and Julio, 2015). By
analyzing firms during the fiscal year preceding the lawsuit filing, this
litigation risk dummy provides a proxy of ex ante litigation risk and
can be used to pursue two different research tracks. The first is to
build predictive models of corporate litigation while the second is ex
post in nature and seeks to explain why firms are sued.
A large component of litigation risk for corporations is industry
based. Francis et al. (1994a, b), find that firms in the biotechnology,
computers, electronics, and retail industries had the highest incidence
of litigation between 1988 and 1992. They create a proxy of litigation
risk as an indicator variable based on affiliation in these four industries
using SIC codes. Several studies use this simple industry indicator as
proxy for litigation risk (i.e. Ali and Kallapur, 2001; Johnson et al.,
2000a, 2001, 2007). Chandra et al. (2004) and Choi (2006) uses a
variation of this litigation proxy by excluding retail firms and restricting
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their analysis to firms belonging to the three high technology
industries used by Francis et al. (1994a, b) (i.e. computer hardware,
computer software, and pharmaceuticals). Kim and Skinner (2012),
however, show that these industry measures of litigation risk have low
predictive power. They find that while litigation tends to cluster in
certain industries, the set of industries varies over time.
As shown by Kim and Skinner (2012), the addition of firm
characteristics to an industry indicator significantly increases the
predictive power of future lawsuits. This more sophisticated measure
of litigation risk, which includes firm-specific and in some cases
industry-wide factors, is the product of logit or probit regression
models of litigation. These models use the predicted probabilities
generated by a binary choice regression as measure of litigation risk.
The explanatory variables of these regressions consist of firm
characteristics that are related to the incidence of litigation. Typical
variables of these models are market capitalization, stock returns,
stock volatility, and stock turnover as well as industry indicator
variables consistent with Francis et al. (1994a, b). Market capitalization
is related to the risk of litigation as larger companies are more likely to
settle with higher payments to plaintiffs. This makes them more
attractive as targets for lawsuits. Stock performance variables are
related to the incidence of security class action lawsuits since such
suits are often triggered by large stock price declines, high stock
volatility, or excessive turnover surrounding the period of the alleged
fraud (Alexander, 1991; Jones and Weingram, 1996; Skinner, 1997;
Dyl, 1999; Simmons and Hoyt, 1993; Gande and Lewis, 2009).
Studies such as Johnson et al. (2000a) and Johnson et al.
(2007) include additional explanatory variables such as stock beta,
return skewness, insider trading, external financing, CEO power, and
management monitoring. Insider trading and high external financing
activity might be used to exploit high stock valuation obtained through
misleading releases of information, activities that increase the risk of
litigation (Brown et al., 2005). Dechow et al. (1996) include a CEO
power variable because CEOs with greater power are more likely to
engage in the opportunistic behaviors that can trigger litigation.
Better monitoring of management and stronger corporate
governance can reduce the incidence of litigation. Daines et al. (2010)
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include corporate governance and transparency ratings variables, but
fail to find these variables having predictive power for litigation. Kim
and Skinner (2012) show that corporate governance and managerial
opportunism variables do not significantly add to the predictive ability
of binary choice regression models of litigation risk.
A few studies analyze the influence of earnings manipulation
and disclosure quality on litigation risk. Firms that manipulate earnings
upward prior to stock issues are more vulnerable to litigation
(DuCharme et al., 2004). The incentive compensation mix for
executives has also an effect on litigation risk by increasing the
probability of earnings manipulation (Peng and Roell, 2008).
Companies that issue earning warnings are in certain cases able to
deter lawsuits (Field et al., 2005).
Brown et al. (2005) and Rogers and Stocken (2005) include
industry dummies to their litigation probability model in addition to
many of the variables mentioned above. Predictive models that include
firm characteristics with industry indicator variables are the most
complete and offer the stronger predictive power (Kim and Skinner,
2012).
Recently, the literature on litigation risk has begun investigating
the role of behavioral factors on lawsuit initiations. Hutton et al.
(2015) find that firms with opposing political values face different
types of lawsuits. Republican-leaning firms are more likely to be
exposed to labor, civil rights, and environmental lawsuits, while
Democratic-leaning firms are more likely to be exposed to securities
and intellectual property lawsuits. Banerjee et al. (2016) find that
executive overconfidence increases the likelihood of securities class
action lawsuits.
Adhikari et al. (2016) report that firms with female executives
experience lower litigation risk.
Directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance coverage
provides an alternative proxy for litigation risk. Companies purchase
D&O liability insurance to provide personal coverage and corporate
reimbursement if a claim is settled with no admission of bad faith or
there is no finding of bad faith in court. One advantage of this proxy is
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that it is able to capture litigation risk for firms that successfully avoid
litigation even though they might be highly exposed to the risk of a
lawsuit. Unfortunately, data on D&O insurance for US firms are not
publicly available and only a few studies have been able to use this
proxy of litigation risk in relation to corporate governance, the quality
of financial reporting and earnings forecasts (i.e. Baker and Griffith,
2007; Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2011, 2014).
While there is extensive research on litigation risk factors in the
USA, little is known about litigation risk at the international level.
Arena and Ferris (2016) explore factors that affect litigation risk
around the world and find that defendant firms headquartered in civil
law countries and in countries with less efficient legal and judiciary
systems face lower litigation risk. Unlike US-centric litigation risk
studies, Arena and Ferris (2016) do not find a significant relation
between stock turnover, cumulative returns, and the probability to be
sued.

3. Litigation costs
Lawsuits often result into significant costs for the sued firms.
Corporate lawsuits have significant direct costs with large negative
effects on profitability, cash holdings, and firm value. The direct costs
consist of settlement disbursements or damages and legal fees. Some
of the direct costs of litigation are defrayed by litigation insurance.
Almost all US publicly traded firms buy personal coverage insurance
(A-side insurance) and corporate reimbursement coverage insurance
for director and executive indemnification reimbursement (B-side
insurance). Many firms also purchase optional entity securities
coverage (C-side insurance) which provides protection to the
corporation from its own liability. C-side litigation insurance, however,
frequently does not provide full coverage. According to the 1996-2006
Towers Perrin D&O Liability Surveys, publicly traded firms have an
average litigation insurance limit of about $15 million. This amount
only covers about 26 percent of the average settlement disbursement
reported by Arena and Julio (2015) for their sample in the same period
($56 million).2 Settlement amounts are positively related to the
severity of the case (Cox and Thomas, 2004) and the magnitude of
shareholder losses (Karpoff et al., 2008a). Securities class actions with
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institutional owners as lead plaintiffs have larger monetary settlements
than lawsuits with individual lead plaintiffs (Cheng et al., 2010).
Before the PSLRA of 1995, 20 percent of the cases resolved into
settlements that exceeded 10 percent of the firm’s annual revenues
(Skinner, 1997). Cutler and Summers (1988) examine the
Pennzoil/Texaco lawsuit and find significant costs associate with the
lawsuit, with the losses for Texaco being larger than the gains for
Pennzoil.
They find that the combined decline in value for the two firms is
about $2 billion and attribute the majority of this drop to an increase
in the costs of financial distress for Texaco. Engelmann and Cornell
(1988) study the wealth implications around filings, verdicts, and
settlements for a sample of five interfirm lawsuits. They also observe
combined wealth losses for the litigating firms.
On December 22, 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which added Section 27(a)(3) to the
Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21D(a)(3) to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. This act added obstacles to securities fraud
class action lawsuits to reduce the incidence of frivolous litigation. The
new rules include a revised lead plaintiff appointment process, the
prohibition of bonus payments to lead plaintiffs, the reduction of
attorneys’ fees to a “reasonable percentage” of any damage award,
the comprehensive disclosure of the provisions of settlement and
attorney’s fees, the change from “joint and several liabilities” to
“proportionate liability,” a higher pleading standard to increase the
cost of lawsuits; and a 90-day “bounce back” rule to prevents case
from rushing into courts. Grundfest and Perino (1997) find that
number of class action security decreased by about 16 percent the
year of the Act compared to the year before. Bajaj et al. (2014) report
that even though the number of state cases increased between 1995
and 1996, the number of total cases declined by 25 percent due to a
drop of about 35 percent in the number of federal cases during the
same period. Perino (2003) extends the analysis up to 2001 and
obtain results consistent with previous researchers. Ferris and
Pritchard (2001) and Johnson et al. (2007) determine that the PSLRA
has significantly decreased the number of frivolous shareholder
lawsuits in the years following the enactment of the act. As we note in
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the introduction to this survey, however, after an initial decline, the
number of lawsuits has resumed its growth. Moreover, settlement
costs have not decreased following the passage of the Reform Act
(Karpoff et al., 2008a).
In addition to settlement disbursements and attorney’s fees,
firms sustain indirect litigation costs that in most circumstances have a
stronger detrimental effect on shareholder and debtholder value than
direct costs. Indirect costs include loss of firm’s credibility, increase in
the perceived uncertainty about a firm’s prospects, loss of customers
and suppliers, and diversion of manages’ time and resources (Karpoff
and Lott, 1993, 1999; Phillips and Miller, 1996; Johnson et al.,
2000a,b; Black et al., 2006). As discussed by Klein and Leffler (1981)
and Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), the revelation of misconduct have
significant effects on corporate costs and operations. Overall, direct
and indirect costs greatly exceed the expected befits accrued to the
plaintiffs (Engelmann and Cornell, 1988).
Karpoff et al. (2008a) estimate the reputational losses sustained
by firms prosecuted for financial misrepresentation by using a modified
version of the empirical procedure introduced by Peltzman (1981).
They find that the reputation loss exceeds the legal penalty by more
than 7.5 times. The reputation loss is larger for firms that rely more on
implicit contracts (e.g. firms with larger R&D expenditures and
intangible assets) consistent with Klein and Leffler (1981) and Landes
and Posner (1987). Murphy et al. (2009) empirically show that losses
in market value upon revelation of corporate misconduct are partially
due to higher firm risk and lower future profitability.

4. Stock market reaction at the time of lawsuit
filings
The earliest law and finance studies concerning corporate
litigation focus on the stock price reaction of defendant firms at
specific times during the lawsuit process. Ellert (1976) examines the
market reaction to announcements of legal challenges to mergers by
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice in the
1950s and 1960s. He finds that, in the month following the lawsuit
filing, the defendant firm’s stock price declines on average by 2
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percent. Fischel and Bradley (1986) analyze the stock price reaction at
the time of a judgement on management motions to dismiss in
derivative suits and discovers a significantly negative return when
lawsuits are dismissed. This suggests that the market views derivative
lawsuits positively. Romano (1991) presents the first event study on
lawsuit filings focusing on a random sample of publicly traded firms
sued between 1966 and 1987. She does not observe any significant
abnormal returns for lawsuit initiations.
Subsequent evidence, however, consistently shows that the
stock market reacts negatively to the filing of corporate lawsuits.
Karpoff and Lott (1993) explore a sample of corporate defendants
accused of fraud. They determine that such firms sustain significant
market losses at the announcement of the accusation. The authors
attribute most of this stock price decline to reputation costs. Bhagat et
al. (1994) perform an event study on interfirm litigation, lawsuits in
which both the plaintiff and the defendant are corporations. They find
joint wealth losses at the time of the lawsuit filing and show that these
stock price declines are mainly due to an increased probability of
financial distress for the defendant firm. In a subsequent study, Bizjak
and Coles (1995) focus on a subset of interim lawsuits (i.e. private
antitrust suits). They determine that joint wealth effects at the time of
the lawsuit filing are negative. They further explain that the decline in
the stock price in antitrust disputes are attributable to the expectation
of court restrictions on the defendant’s business practices and the
likelihood of additional suits and financial distress. Bizjak and Coles
(1995) also find a positive stock market reaction for plaintiff firms
upon at the time of the lawsuit initiation.
Bhagat et al. (1998) examine the wealth effects of all types of
corporate lawsuits filed between 1981 and 1983. They report that
regardless of the identity of the entity or individual that brought the
lawsuit against a firm (i.e. government entity, another firm, or a
private citizen), the defendant firm’s stock price experiences a
statistically significant decline upon the lawsuit filing.
Gande and Lewis (2009) examine a comprehensive sample of
security class action lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2003 and confirm
significantly negative stock price reactions at the announcement. They
also find that shareholders partially anticipate these lawsuits based on
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lawsuits against other firms in the same industry and capitalize some
of these losses prior to the lawsuit filing date. Klock (2015)
investigates a sample of class action lawsuits between 1995 (the year
of the enactment of the PSLRA) and 2012 and obtains results
consistent with those of Gande and Lewis (2009).
Bhattacharya et al. (2007) study the stock market reaction to
lawsuit filings for non-US firms sued in US courts. They find that nonUS firms sustain larger stock market losses at the announcement,
which is a rational adjustment to their higher probability to lose in
comparison to US defendant firms.

5. The effect of litigation on corporate behavior,
decisions, and outcomes
Litigation risk and lawsuits have significant long-lasting effects
on the defendant firm, its executives and directors. The law and
finance literature provides an extensive examination of the
ramification of corporate litigation on a large number of corporate
activities, policies, behaviors, and outcomes such as equity issuance
and IPO underpricing, debt financing, cost of capital, corporate
governance, investment decisions, and insider trading. In the following
sections we survey studies in each of these areas.

5.1 Equity issuance and IPO underpricing
The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 provides shareholders the
right to sue a firm going public (i.e. an IPO) for material
misstatements or omissions. The great majority of IPO lawsuits
against the issuing firms are brought under Sections 11 and 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934
(Lowry and Shu, 2002). Under Section 11, damages for direct
purchasers of IPO stocks depend on the difference between the offer
price and either the sale price or the security’s price at the time of the
lawsuit. Aftermarket purchasers can also sue the IPO firm if they can
demonstrate that they relied on the prospectus to make their
purchasing decision. Because damages are directly related to the offer
price, a firm that underprices its IPO more aggressively has lower
potential damages and a decreased probability of being sued. A
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possible motivation for IPO underpricing is, therefore, to reduce
litigation risk.3
Litigation risk is one of the main long-standing explanations of
underpricing along with the signaling and information asymmetry
hypotheses. Ibbotson (1975) is the first to posit that IPO firms
underprice their shares to protect themselves from the risk of
litigation. Tinic (1988) formulates a model of the expected cost of legal
liabilities as a function of the difference between the offer price and
the post-offer price. Hughes and Thakor (1992) further develop Tinic’s
model in a game-theory setting and specify the conditions to reach
equilibrium in underpricing. Hensler (1995) offers another variation of
Tinic’s theory by developing a utility maximization singleperiod model.
Several empirical studies test these theoretical models. Tinic
(1988) compares underpricing before the 1933 Securities Act (i.e.
1923-1930) with underpricing after the enactment of the Act (i.e.
1966-1970). He discovers that underpricing is significantly higher in
the later period which is consistent with the litigation risk hypothesis of
underpricing. Drake and Vetsuypens (1993), however, report that the
average initial returns between 1972 and 1977 are actually lower than
those before 1933. They argue that Tinic’s results might be driven by
factors other than litigation risk. Keloharju (1993) test different
underpricing hypotheses in the Finnish stock market. He finds a mean
underpricing of 8.7 percent, which is significantly lower than that for
US IPO firms during the same period. He concludes that, because IPO
litigation in Finland is virtually non-existent, the difference in
underpricing can be at least partially explained by litigation risk. Drake
and Vetsuypens (1993) find that IPO firms with positive initial returns
are more likely to be sued than firms with negative returns. Even
though their result is inconsistent with the litigation risk hypothesis,
the validity of their conclusion is challenged by potential endogeneity.4
Lowry and Shu (2002) use a simultaneous equation model to control
for the endogeneity between litigation risk and underpricing that
affected previous studies. Their results show that underpricing has
both an insurance and a deterrence effect on litigation. Firms with
higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs more to reduce the risk of
being sued and a more pronounced underpricing reduces expected
litigation costs.
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Following the bust of the internet bubble in the early 2000s, a
multitude of IPO allocation lawsuits were filed in the Southern District
Court of New York against investment banks that underwrote IPOs in
the previous three years. Zhu (2009) analyses 259 IPO allocation
cases involving 28 percent of the 906 firms that went public between
1998 and 2000. Unlike traditional Section 11 IPO lawsuits, allocation
lawsuits charge underwriters for an excessive increase in aftermarket
prices. IPOs with higher underpricing, therefore, are more likely to
trigger allocation lawsuits. Zhu (2009) finds that, because the
predominance of this type of IPO lawsuits in the early 2000s, deeper
underpricing did not reduce litigation risk during that specific period.
Hao (2011) does not observe firms with higher litigation risk
underpricing their IPOs more during her sample period of 1995-2005.
She finds, however, that firms which are more likely to withdraw their
offerings face higher litigation risk if they complete the IPO. Further,
she reports that firms with higher litigation risk pay a higher gross
spread to their underwriters. Walker et al. (2015) posit that plaintiffs
of IPO lawsuits manifest opportunistic behavior. They find that the
main predictors of litigation and settlement amounts are the monetary
damages that plaintiffs can claim and the remaining wealth available in
the firm. Hanley and Hoberg (2012) perform a word content analysis
on IPO prospectuses and find a trade-off between underpricing and
disclosure as hedges against litigation. While strong disclosure is an
effective hedge against all types of IPO lawsuits, underpricing is
effective mainly in preventing Section 11 litigation. Ferris et al. (2013)
use textual analysis to examine the incidence of conservatism in a set
of IPO prospectuses over 1999-2005. They determine that auditor
stature is positively related to prospectus conservatism. They conclude
that more reputable auditors tend to encourage issuer conservatism,
perhaps in response to reputation concerns and concern over legal
liability.
Recently researchers have begun to analyze the relation
between litigation risk and IPO underpricing at the international level
using a cross-country framework. Banerjee et al. (2011) and Lin et al.
(2013), consistent with the litigation risk hypothesis of underpricing,
find that higher litigation risk in a specific country the larger is
associated with greater underpricing of the IPOs in that country.
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5.2 Cost of capital
Due to its significant direct and indirect costs, corporate
litigation has an important effect on the defendant firm’s cost of
capital. Firms that are subject to accounting enforcement actions by
the SEC experience a significant increase in their cost of capital
(Dechow et al., 1996). Following a lawsuit filing or revelation of
corporate misconduct, the defendant firm’s stock tends to experience
an increase in idiosyncratic volatility. This has a consequent effect on
the firm’s cost of capital (Murphy et al., 2009). Chava et al. (2010)
report that, at the time of a filing of a class action lawsuit, the
defendant firm’s cost of equity capital significantly increases and that
this increase is incremental over the effect of the disclosure
announcement. They also find that accounting fraud lawsuits and
lawsuits with high merit have a stronger effect on cost of capital.
Both at the time when firms experience litigation risk and after
the filing of a litigation, firms sustain higher interest on their bank
loans. Banks price litigation risk in loan contracting by charging a
higher spread, offering shorter maturity loan, or loans with more
covenants to firms with higher likelihood to be sued (Yuan and Zhang,
2015). Following the filing of a class action security lawsuit, defendant
firms experience an increase in loan spreads, higher up-front
borrowing charges, and more financial covenants and collateral
requirements (Deng et al., 2014). When corporate directors are more
insulated from potential litigation due to limited liability and
indemnification provisions, firms benefit from higher credit ratings and
lower yield spreads (Bradley and Chen, 2011).

5.3 Corporate financial policies
Recently the finance literature has started investigating the
effect of litigation on corporate financial policies. Corporate managers
are likely to manage expected future litigation costs by modifying
financial policies. Arena and Julio (2015) find that firms significantly
increase the level of their cash holdings in anticipation of lawsuits. The
market value of cash is significantly lower for firms exposed to
litigation risk. One mechanism through which firms accumulate cash is
by reducing corporate investments. Conversely, firms that overinvest
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are more likely to get sued (McTier and Wald, 2011). Firms with a
higher risk of costly lawsuits are more likely to undertake aggressive
growth through acquisitions to diversify their risk (Gormley and Matsa,
2011).
The full implications of litigation on firm value and liquidity are
only known at the time of the lawsuit resolution. Firms, therefore, are
likely to further adjust financial policies at the time of a lawsuit
settlement. Arena and Julio (2016) show that firms set their pay out
policy based on the perceived litigation risk and then change their
share repurchase policy once the lawsuit is resolved. Firms that face
significant litigation risk pay lower dividends or omit dividends while
distributing more cash through share repurchase programs. This
increase in pay out flexibility allows firms to more easily decrease cash
distributions to shareholders if anticipated litigation expenses are
subsequently incurred. McTier and Wald (2011) also find that firms
reduce pay outs following a lawsuit. In addition firms are likely to
reduce overinvestment activity, cash holdings, and diversification postsuit. Autore et al. (2014) discover that firms tend also to reduce their
reliance on debt and equity financing following severe litigation
episodes.

5.4 Financial reporting
The accounting literature has extensively explored the effect of
litigation on financial reporting and disclosure. We report a brief
overview of the main studies on this issue due to the important
influence that financial reporting has on many corporate financial
decisions and outcomes.
The early empirical evidence on the effect of financial disclosure
and litigation risk is mixed. While Skinner (1994) states that voluntary
earnings releases can decrease the risk of litigation, Francis et al.
(1994a, b) determine that early disclosure increases a firm’s legal
exposure.
There are several reasons why earnings warnings can reduce
the probability of a lawsuit. Timely disclosure reduces the time the
stock trades at inflated prices, which in turn leads to a reduced
incentive for plaintiffs to sue or lower settlements. Early disclosure
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weakens the claim that the firm withheld information and can also
decrease contingent lawsuit loss (Skinner, 1994, 1997). Francis et al.
(1994a, b), however, empirically observe that earnings warnings are
likely to be followed by class action securities lawsuits. Their results,
however, have been received with scepticism due to possible
endogeneity. Firms with bad news are concurrently likely to disclose
them and to be sued. The spurious relation between disclosure and
lawsuits has the effect of concealing the lawsuit deterrence effect of
disclosure (Skinner, 1997; Field et al., 2005). Field et al. (2005)
employ a simultaneous equations method and find that disclosure
deters litigation rather than triggering it. By employing a new measure
of the timeliness of earnings news, Donelson et al. (2012) obtain
similar results. After the resolution of a lawsuit, defendant firms tend
to reduce the level of information disclosed to investors (Johnson et
al., 2001; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009). Rogers et al. (2011)
examine the tone of disclosure through a textual analysis and find that
companies which are unusually optimistic in their earnings
announcements or in which managers engage in abnormal selling are
more likely to be targets of lawsuits.

5.5 Corporate governance
Litigation has also a significant effect on internal governance
mechanisms. Romano (1991) finds that managerial turnover is more
frequent for firms involved in litigation. While Agrawal et al. (1999)
and Helland (2006) do not find unusual turnover among executives
and directors of firms charged with fraud, Niehaus and Roth (1999)
show that lawsuits that terminate with large settlements are likely to
result in CEO turnover. Similarly, executives that are found guilty of
financial misrepresentation by the Security and Exchange Commission
and the Department of Justice are almost always removed from their
position and bear significant financial losses (Karpoff et al., 2008b).
Security class action lawsuits increase the likelihood that the CEO will
suffer a reduction in compensation or be laid off, and increase the
likelihood that the firm will receive a disciplinary takeover bid
(Humphery-Jenner, 2012).
Outside board directors do not face abnormal turnover in firms
involved in litigation, but they tend to lose a significant number of
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board seats held in other firms (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). The
monitoring quality of boards of directors significantly improves
following the filing of derivative lawsuits. In particular, the number of
independent directors increases following derivative litigation (Ferris et
al., 2007). Similarly, after being involved in a fraud case, firms take
actions to improve their governance practices by increasing the
number of independent directors and audit committee meetings. Both
operating and stock performance improve after these changes (Farber,
2005; Marciukaityte et al., 2006). The improvement in board
independence is especially significant when institutional investors
serve as lead plaintiff in the security class action lawsuit (Cheng et al.,
2010).
While the evidence discussed above views litigation as an
effective external force to improve internal governance practices, some
studies present evidence that suggests that litigation in some cases
can have the effect of increasing agency conflicts. Peng and Roell
(2008) show that incentive compensation with stock options
encourages firms to manipulate earnings during litigation class
periods. During that time executives exercise more options and sell
more shares. Dai et al. (2014) find that pay-for-performance
sensitivity decreases after the announcement of a lawsuit filing, but
reverts back to its original level after the resolution of the lawsuit.
Gormley and Matsa (2011) find that firms with employees exposed to
newly identified carcinogens respond to the increase in litigation risk
by growing through diversifying acquisitions, which on average are
associated with negative announcements returns.

5.6 Insider trading
Niehaus and Roth (1999) analyze a small sample of class action
lawsuits between 1988 and 1994 and do not find abnormal insider
trading activity during the class action period. Later studies on larger
samples, however, do provide evidence of insider trading surrounding
lawsuits. Griffin et al. (2004) determine that during the class action
period net insider sales are significantly higher than that for insiders of
matched non-sued firms. Iqbal et al. (2007) find evidence of insider
trading prior to the filing of a lawsuit. Bradley et al. (2014) report that
managers significantly increase their informed option exercise during

Managerial Finance, Vol 43, No. 1 (2017): pg. 4-18. DOI. This article is © Emerald and permission has been granted for
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald.

16

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

the class period. Overall, excluding Niehaus and Roth (1999), all
research on litigation and insider trading provides evidence of
managers exploiting private information around security lawsuit events
and therefore supports the merits of security class action litigation.

6. Litigation and the politically connected firm
The extent to which politically connected firms benefit while in
the process of litigation represents yet another area with implications
for corporate finance. Correia (2014) studies SEC initiated lawsuits and
reports that politically connected firms face less litigation risk and are
awarded lower penalties. Firth et al. (2011) conclude that there is a
favorable bias toward politically connected firms in the Chinese court
system. Fulmer and Knill (2013) find that CEOs who contribute to PACs
receive reduced penalties when prosecuted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the Department of Justice. Abdulmanova
(2016) examines federal and state political connections for a large
sample of US firms and concludes that such influence helps to
decrease the losses associated with federal class action litigation.

7. Summary and directions for future research
As noted in this survey, the issue of corporate litigation is one of
increasing importance to the modern firm. Its importance resides in
the fact that litigation has the ability to influence essentially every
aspect of the firm’s operations. Indeed, we have described how
litigation can influence equity issuance decisions, the firm’s cost of
capital, financial reporting, and corporate governance. The
consequence of its effect on firm value and profitability is vast. These
effects of litigation justify its importance as a subject for academic
study.
The academic literature in this area is exceptionally interdisciplinary. The litigation area itself is organic to law, but because of
its effect on the firm’s activities, it has expanded to include finance,
management, accounting, and economics. Because much of the
litigation literature focuses on an understanding of why firms are sued,
there is also extensive work appearing in the psychology and political
science literatures.
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In spite of the extensive work already done in litigation, a
number of issues remain either unaddressed or only partially
examined. Hence, they represent an exceptionally attractive
opportunity for future research. For instance, little work has been done
regarding international litigation and how patterns observed in US
corporate lawsuits differ globally. Especially interesting in this regard is
how national culture might affect both the incidence and the outcomes
of business litigation.
Corporate governance determines the degree to which its
managers are monitored and how the firm makes its strategic
decisions. Consequently, when governance systems fail and a lawsuit
is initiated, the firm’s directors and executives automatically become
defendant in the suit. Thus, there are abundant research opportunities
to investigate the influence that corporate governance structures exert
on the decision to litigate, the resolution of that litigation and how the
settlements are satisfied.
Because of the magnitude of the settlements and the changes in
corporate strategy that litigation involves, these lawsuits can exert a
long-term effect on the value and operations of a firm. Litigation can
effect corporate decisions about merger and acquisition, capital
expenditures, R&D, and even dividends. The long-term financial and
operating effects of litigation represents yet another stream of inquiry
for future researchers.
Litigation is often the result of investor attention and the result
of media coverage. Recent work by Abdulmanova et al. (2016) use a
novel measure of investor attention to explain when lawsuits are filed
and the market’s reaction to such filings. The use of social media and
other internet-based software to follow corporate activities represents
yet another direction for the future study of corporate litigation.
Notes
1

Audit analytics and litigation cost survey of major companies, US
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 2010.
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2

Similarly, Cornerstone Research reports an average settlement for
security class action lawsuits of $47 million for the 1996-2014
period.

3

Sections 12 and 10(b) similarly apply to both direct and aftermarket
purchasers. However, damages under both these sections are
based on the investor’s purchase price rather than the offer
price.

4

As explained by Lowry and Shu (2002) “Under the litigation-risk
hypothesis, initial returns can be related to the probability of a
lawsuit along two dimensions. First, firms with higher litigation
risk should underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as
insurance against litigation. This implies that initial returns are
an increasing function of litigation risk. Second, firms that buy
more insurance against litigation, i.e., underprice more, expect
to be sued less often. This implies that litigation is a decreasing
function of initial returns. Because the probability of being sued
is itself an endogenous variable that could depend on
underpricing, a comparison of initial returns across sued and
non-sued firms is problematic.”
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